När kan man säga att Väst är en part i Ukrainakriget?
Inom forskningen finns en generellt vedertagen definition för begreppet väpnad konflikt, vilken är att minst två parter, varav minst en stat, strider militärt om en politisk eller territoriell fråga samt att den orsakar minst 25 stridsrelaterade dödsfall under ett kalenderår.
Om den väpnade konflikten leder till minst 1 000 dödsfall på samma period definieras det som krig.
I akademisk mening deltar alltså Sverige inte i Ukrainakriget hur många stridsvagnar som än skulle skickas eller om Gripenplan någon gång kommer att doneras. Inte heller om svenska underrättelser skulle vara direkt avgörande för ukrainsk militär att slå ut ryska soldater eller mål.
– Om man ska räknas som en sekundär stridande part ska man vara på plats för att just strida. Utbildningspersonal, rådgivare och annat är ändå en konfliktparts stöd som är intressant att titta på eftersom de påverkar konflikterna på väldigt många sätt och ofta gör dem längre, blodigare och svårare att lösa, säger Therese Pettersson.
DN 29 januari 2023
https://www.dn.se/varlden/nar-kan-man-saga-att-vast-ar-en-part-i-ukrainakriget/
S-regeringen sa i början av kriget först blankt nej till att exportera vapen till Ukraina och skickade sedan skyddsutrustning och lätta vapen.
Kristerssonkoalitionen var däremot glasklar redan innan Ryssland anföll Kiev 24 februari i fjol. Då drev man Anderssonregeringen framför sig – nu driver Sverige på för att västländerna inte ska svikta i stödet, utan tvärtom skruva upp det.
Det senaste paketet med löfte om Archers, pansarvärnsroboten NLAW och hela 50 stycken stridsfordon 90 gav eko även internationellt. Sveriges bidrag lyftes fram av den amerikanske försvarsministern som en viktig del i ett ”mycket kapabelt paket” som kan hjälpa Ukraina att nå framgångar på slagfältet.
Exzpressen 27 januari 2023
https://www.expressen.se/ledare/antligen-kan-vi-vara--stolta-over-sverige/
The West Is Getting In Too Deep in Ukraine
The drive to defeat Vladimir Putin is taking on a dangerous and heedless momentum all its own, just like Iraq.
It’s not even plain, in the absence of public debate, that most people in Western nations support a deepening of their confrontation with Russia. In fact, their opinion is hardly being sought.
A German population sharply divided over the question of sending Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine at least conducted a long internal discussion.
The US and UK governments barely informed their citizens before committing more advanced weaponry to the conflict.
Western governments benefit today from a broad and largely unchallenged consensus among think tanks and mainstream periodicals: Russia’s defeat, if not outright capitulation, is crucial to ensuring Ukraine’s territorial integrity and future as a sovereign nation.
Pankaj Mishra Bloomberg 30 januari 2023
Ukraine should—and, properly supported, can—seize Crimea
If this war is about more than just Ukraine, and instead about the preservation of the international rules-based order and the prevention of Russian aggression against Europe, then it should be unacceptable for Russia to be rewarded for its invasion. Yet any peace deal which granted it territory would do just that. And talks have been tried before.
The Minsk agreements, signed after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014, led to a frozen conflict which Vladimir Putin thawed at a moment of his choosing.
The most important reason why Ukraine should not negotiate with Russia is that it may now have a chance to win back Crimea. It is the most crucial piece of territory Russia seized in 2014
Crimea is also useful to Russia itself. It is home to the Black Sea Fleet, a launchpad for drones and other weapons, a logistics hub and a trading port for Russian merchant shipping.
Because Crimea is decisive, and because it is becoming clearer that Ukrainian forces can liberate Crimea, Ukraine must not negotiate now. Russia would never agree to trade Crimea away.
Instead Ukraine should fight to liberate Crimea.
Ben Hodges The Economist 29 January 2023
Ben Hodges served as commanding general of the U.S. Army in Europe between 2014 and 2018.
This article is part of a series debating the merits of peace talks between Ukraine and Russia.
For a contrary argument please see Christopher Chivvis’s article.
I sympathise with Ukraine’s desire to fight on until it drives Russian forces from all Ukrainian territory. I’m sure Ukrainian leaders worry that peace talks will demoralise their troops, who are fighting so bravely. Their cause is just. But their war aims are unrealistic.
Western tanks are a symbol of commitment and they will eventually improve Ukraine’s chances of piercing Russian fortifications. But they are not a game changer.
With luck the tanks may encourage Vladimir Putin to consider negotiations seriously. But he still cannot afford to retreat with nothing to show for his war, however deplorable it is.
Given how much he has staked on this operation, its failure—let alone a larger loss that includes Crimea or other territory Russia took in 2014—would risk a revolt from inside Russia’s elites that destabilises his regime.
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