Englund

When Adolf Hitler came to power in 1933, Germany’s economy was in dire straits. Under Chancellor Heinrich Brüningthe German government had clung dogmatically to economic orthodoxy in the face of the Great Depression, staying on the gold standard /fast växelkurs/ and imposing ever harsher fiscal austerity /den som är satt i skuld är inte fri/.  The result was economic devastation and extremely high unemployment. Hitler broke with the economic orthodoxy, enabling him to preside over a rapid economic recovery.  The popularity he gained from the economic revival allowed him to consolidate power. Paul Krugman Substack Feb 27, 2026 https://paulkrugman.substack.com/p/the-economics-of-faltering-fascism There was hyperinflation during the Weimar era, and it did contribute to a general sense of chaos that undermined the fledgling republic.  But that peaked in 1923, the year Hitler botched a putsch and went to jail — a full decade before he seized power.  https://englundmacro.b...

In 1931: Debt, Crisis, and the Rise of Hitler, economic historian Tobias Straumann of the University of Zurich offers an impressive, fast-paced narrative account of the crucial phase in Germany’s Great Depression, underscoring the point about consensus and the politics of debt Breaking with what has become conventional wisdom, Straumann does not see the politicians of the Depression era – particularly Heinrich Brüning, known as the “Hunger Chancellor” – as having made bad choices in pushing austerity when they did.  The burden of external debt (in the form of war reparations) played a critical role in creating these political conditions. As Straumann shows, it was Adolf Hitler’s campaign against a new reparations program (the 1929 Young Plan) that brought the National Socialists back from the political wilderness.   Adam Tooze, who has also written extensively on Germany and the interwar failures, has produced a genuinely global narrative chronicle of the explosion of cen...

are two of the most stimulating histories of the interwar period to have been published in recent years. Because we know that the period ended in the most destructive war in history, it is tempting to conclude that this outcome was foreordained in events 10 or 20 years earlier.  Such determinism often comes with an assumption that there was something inevitable about the collapse of Germany’s democratic Weimar Republic Tony Barber, Europe Editor of the Financial Times, 8 July 2020 Heinrich Brüning Popular mythology in Germany has it that the Weimar hyperinflation of 1922-23 led directly to the rise of Hitler.  This is not true.

Most Germans believe their country’s interwar period was shaped by only one crisis that led to the rise of Adolf Hitler -- hyperinflation during the Weimar Republic, In reality though, the Nazis took power after a period of deflation, more than a decade after runaway inflation had ended. According to the Jacques Delors Institute in Berlin , that criticism stems from the fact that many Germans don’t quite understand their own history. Blooomberg 2 November 2019 Den tyska hyperinflationen. "De eldade med pengar – sen kom Hitler." Fel, fel, fel.

The Great War and the Remaking of Global Order, 1916-1931  With hindsight we date the onset of the Great Depression back to the Wall Street crash of October 1929. But that was not obvious at the time. At first it seemed the world economy might merely be entering a normal cyclical downturn. It was in 1931 with the sequence of the Austrian banking crisis, the shutdown of the German financial system and then Britain’s departure from the gold standard that it became clear that this recession was, indeed, a major turning point in world history. To win support for his deeply unpopular austerity measures, Brüning chose to parade his nationalist colours Adam Tooze FT 5 July 2019 Adam Tooze is the author of ‘Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crises Changed the World’ Popular mythology in Germany has it that the Weimar hyperinflation of 1922-23 led directly to the rise of Hitler. This is not true.  1929

Simon Kuper FT 1 November 2018

Chancellor Brüning's austerity policies went far beyond keeping interest rates high to stay on the gold standard and stem capital flight.  A series of draconian fiscal budgets imposed severe spending cuts and tax rises Frances Coppola 28 December 2017

Heinrich Brüning -  When the Reichstag threw out his austerity budget, it was imposed by presidential decree. Hitler won the 1932 general election with a landslide.  The rest, as they say, is history. Frances Coppola 31 August 2014

Hyperinflationen under mellankrigsåren är en mardröm som ska prägla tyskarna länge. I detta trauma bottnar Bundesbanks inflationsskräck, Maastrichtavtalets stränga stabilitetskriterier och vad som ibland har upplevts som en hård och obarmhärtig attityd i eurokrisen. Tomas Lundin, SvD 3 juli 2017 I oktober 1924 ersätts Rentenmark av Reichsmark. Denna stöds av de allierade som nu vill skapa ett skapa ett stabilt och ekonomiskt starkt Tyskland i stället för kaos. Men då är det redan för sent. Den 30 januari 1933 utses Adolf Hitler till rikskansler. Full text Den uppmärksamme läsaren noterar hoppet på nio år från 1924 till 1933. Vad hände då? The Nazis only won 32 Reichstag seats in the election of May 1924, and just 12 in 1928. The Nazi party did not become a popular political force until long after the hyperinflation period ended. The Economist, November 15th 2013 It is sometimes said that German attitudes to the economy and the current crisis are instructed by ex...

 - Man återkommer ständigt till Keynes och Hayek. Har den ekonomiska "vetenskapen" inte kommit längre?  - Är det så hemskt att vi faktiskt inte vet hur vi skall undvika att den nuvarande ekonomin byggd på en allt högre belåning av stigande huspriser skall kunna brytas och ersättas med något annat, vad det nu kan vara,   frågade jag på denna blog för några dagar sedan . Vi är i ett läge där räntorna är, och har varit, extremt låga, återhämtningen dröjer trots att villapriserna har lyckats återvända till nivåerna de hade innan de föll och utlöste finanskrisen. Några enarmade ekonomer är inte inom synhåll. Tvärtom är debatten hårdare och bittrare än någon gång sedan Keynes och Hayek drabbade samman på 1930-talet. Krugman vs. Tea Party. Det är inte bara jag som tycker så. I dag läste jag följande. "Battle raging between the world’s leading macroeconomists"  The European Central Bank has found itself caught in the crossfire  The Bank for International ...

Det var inte inflationen som förde Hitler till makten, som Fokus och många andra tror, det var arbetslösheten, skrev jag senast på denna blog den  13/11 2011 Eine Kolumne von Wolfgang Münchau,  Der Spielgel 23/11 2011 Das Hauptproblem: Die Regierungen der Euro-Zone sitzen alten deutschen Lügen auf. Ich nenne es die Fiskal-Lüge, die Reduzierung aller Ursachen auf eine unverantwortliche Haushaltspolitik. Die zweite Lüge ist die Inflationslüge, wonach Deutschland aufgrund seiner historischen Erfahrungen mit der Inflation mehr als andere Staaten auf dem Prinzip der Preisstabilität beharrt. Diese Lüge wird momentan angeführt, um zu verhindern, dass die Europäische Zentralbank in großem Maße Anleihen aufkauft. Angeblich würde das die Inflation ankurbeln. Ob es in den jetzigen Zeiten tatsächlich zu einer Inflation käme, sei einmal dahingestellt. Interessanter ist die Lüge an sich, denn die deutschen wirtschaftshistorischen Erfahrungen sind gar nicht einmal so fundamental...