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2019-11-20

I /John Mauldin/ agree with Ray Dalio that we are almost certainly going to monetize it.

We are not going to get out of this debt trap by cutting benefits or raising taxes. I agree with Ray Dalio that we are almost certainly going to monetize it. 

I highly suggest that you read his latest piece titled 

“The World Has Gone Mad and the System Is Broken.”

It is the shortest and best summary of his views that he has put out in a long time.

think we will spend the latter part of the 2020s going through a kind of worldwide bankruptcy. We will collectively realize the situation can’t go on and find a way to end it. I’ve taken to calling this “the Great Reset.”

Ray Dalio is the thoughtful, somewhat controversial founder of the world’s largest hedge fund, Bridgewater Associates, which he started in 1975. 


2019-11-19

Pierre Schori, U-båtarna och Amalia

Försvarsmaktens slutsats efter ubåtsjakten 2014 är att det är ställt ”utom allt rimligt tvivel” att Sverige utsattes för en kränkning.

Samtidigt meddelade man redan 2015 att det enskilt tyngsta beviset hade fallit bort och hade en ”annan förklaring” utan att gå in på vilken.

Vid Horsfjärdenincidenten 1982 var en viktig omständighet för utpekandet av Sovjet en 3,47 minuter lång ljudinspelning. I ubåtsutredningen 2001 beskrevs ljudet fortfarande som ”det tydligaste beviset på ubåt som framkom under hela Horsfjärdenjakten”.

2008 visade en förnyad analys från Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, FOI, att hydrofonträffen kom från taxibåten Amalia

Jonas Gummesson SvD 19 November 2019

Bildt, U-båtarna och Amalia



2019-11-15

Mainstream economists considered the great 2008 financial crisis an unforeseen – and indeed unforeseeable – shock.

This interpretation was useful, because it protected those who held it from the charge that they should have seen the crisis coming and acted to prevent it. 

But one cannot really fault mainstream economists for taking this position. To do otherwise would have been to cast doubt on the intellectual primacy of their creed. 

It was necessary, therefore, that those who actually did foresee the crisis – and there were many, some on the academic fringes and others in finance – should be ignored.




Fundamental questions about the future of the world’s dominant economic model




2019-11-08

Jag har slutat oroa mig för klimatet. Det är säkert ingen fara.

Våra politiker och media, som verkligen vet hur det är, fortsätter ju som vanligt. Debatten rullar på. Är moderaterna liberalkonservativa? Kan blockpolitiken överleva? Varningar utfärdas regelbundet från moderaterna och försvarsindustrin för hotet från Ryssland och misstänkta,  för att inte säga konstaterade, u-nätar. Regeringen vill bygga höghastighetståg och i likhet med Tyskland fortsätta avvecklingen av kärnkraften. Vår tid är nu sägs det och man kan fortsätta att titta på Hem till gården, Downton Abbey och The Big Bang Theory.

Den enda som är uppriktig är Trump, som bestämt att USA skall lämna Paris-avtalet. Detta kan bara göra folk oroliga. Bäst är att fortsätta att hylla Paris-avtalet, vad det nu innebär, det är väl ingen som vet, och fortsätta som vanligt. Det är ju snart val igen.

Och Värdegrunden, tänk på den.

2019-11-05

How and why economics forgot Keynes’ warnings on panics - Akerlof

The real world is hideously complex. So too are people. If economists are going to tell us anything about either, then they must resort to abstraction.

The trouble is what happens when what you choose to leave out one of the things that ends up mattering the most?

Nobel Prize winning economist George Akerlof does a brilliant job of explaining how and why, in the decades before the financial crash, macroeconomists failed to include any meaningful role of the financial system in their economic models.

Claire Jones FT Alphaville 5 November 2015


What They Were Thinking Then: The Consequences for Macroeconomics

Five years before the financial meltdown of 2008, Robert Lucas famously declared that “the central problem of depression-prevention has been solved . . . and it has been for many decades”.


2019-11-04

We need to admit the euro was a mistake - Hungarian central bank governor calls for an exit mechanism

Two decades after the euro’s launch, most of the necessary pillars of a successful global currency — a common state, a budget covering at least 15-20 per cent of the eurozone’s total gross domestic product, a eurozone finance minister and a ministry to go with the post — are still missing.

We rarely admit the real roots of the ill-advised decision to create the common currency: 

it was a French snare. As Germany unified, François Mitterrand, then French president, feared growing German power and believed convincing the country to give up its Deutschemark would be enough to avoid a German Europe. 

The chancellor of the time, Helmut Kohl, gave in and considered the euro the ultimate price for a unified Germany.

Gyorgy Matolcsy FT 3 November 2019

The euro was not a German project. Quite the reverse. German voters wanted to hold on to their currency. The euro was the price Helmut Kohl paid to Mitterrand to win his blessing for reunification.
Philip Stephens, Financial Times 18 April 2013

In Strasbourg on Dec. 9, 1989, after the Berlin Wall fell, Germany agreed to monetary union in order to get President Mitterand to agree to German reunification





2019-11-03

It was Angela Merkel who “saved the euro” in the summer of 2012

and she did so because the Italian and Spanish bond markets were by then imploding. 

At that point, she agreed to let the ECB act as lender-of-last resort 

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard 30 October 2019


- Den stora risken var att Grekland skulle utlösa en kris i italienska, franska och tyska banker. 
Nu finns i praktiken en EU-garanti för de utestående grekiska statsobligationerna.

Anders Borg, TT, SvD papper 22 februari 2012






2019-11-02

Inflation-Phobic Germans Misunderstand Their History, Study Says

Most Germans believe their country’s interwar period was shaped by only one crisis that led to the rise of Adolf Hitler -- hyperinflation during the Weimar Republic,

In reality though, the Nazis took power after a period of deflation, more than a decade after runaway inflation had ended.

According to the Jacques Delors Institute in Berlin, that criticism stems from the fact that many Germans don’t quite understand their own history.