Wolodarski och Tysklands framgång med Ådalsmetoden
Eurons första tio år var en trist historia för de flesta tyskar, som mest ägnat sig åt att spara, effektivisera och skära ned i sin välfärdsstat. Rensat för inflation har inkomstutvecklingen varit skral.
Det skrev Peter Wolodarski, DN 4 december 2011
Anledningen till det var, som Martin Wolf påpekade den 31 mars 1999, att "Few have realised the most dangerous feature of Emu: it has locked Germany into a seriously uncompetitive real exchange rate".
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard beskrev detta häromdagen i en lysande artikel:
The Germans gave up the D-Mark reluctantly under French and Italian pressure, as the price for acquiescence in Reunification. They entered EMU at an overvalued rate after the Reunification bubble, leaving them in semi-slump for half a decade.
They slowly clawed back competitiveness the hard way, by squeezing wages and driving up productivity. It is entirely understandable that they now think Club Med can and should do the same.
Tyskland lyckades således genomföra vad ekonomerna kallar en interndevalvering.
Jag har tidigare på denna blog, Greklands interndevalvering och Ådalshändelserna dömt ut interndevalvering som en möjlig väg ur krisen.
Hur kunde då Tyskland lyckas med det som i dag framstår som omöjligt för länderna i Sydeuropa?
Ambrose förklarar:
Germany was able to lower relative wages during
a) a global boom,
b) against other EMU states that were inflating
c) and with benchmark borrowing cost that stayed low even during the dog days.
None of these factors apply to Italy or Spain now.
But this is hard to explain this to the man or woman on the Berlin tram.
Det skrev Peter Wolodarski, DN 4 december 2011
Anledningen till det var, som Martin Wolf påpekade den 31 mars 1999, att "Few have realised the most dangerous feature of Emu: it has locked Germany into a seriously uncompetitive real exchange rate".
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard beskrev detta häromdagen i en lysande artikel:
The Germans gave up the D-Mark reluctantly under French and Italian pressure, as the price for acquiescence in Reunification. They entered EMU at an overvalued rate after the Reunification bubble, leaving them in semi-slump for half a decade.
They slowly clawed back competitiveness the hard way, by squeezing wages and driving up productivity. It is entirely understandable that they now think Club Med can and should do the same.
Tyskland lyckades således genomföra vad ekonomerna kallar en interndevalvering.
Jag har tidigare på denna blog, Greklands interndevalvering och Ådalshändelserna dömt ut interndevalvering som en möjlig väg ur krisen.
Hur kunde då Tyskland lyckas med det som i dag framstår som omöjligt för länderna i Sydeuropa?
Ambrose förklarar:
Germany was able to lower relative wages during
a) a global boom,
b) against other EMU states that were inflating
c) and with benchmark borrowing cost that stayed low even during the dog days.
None of these factors apply to Italy or Spain now.
But this is hard to explain this to the man or woman on the Berlin tram.
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