The emerging China shock 2.0 - Ambrose, Brad Setser macro commentator supreme


The Premier’s speech at “summer Davos” always carries a message. Two years ago it was China’s macroeconomic balance. Last year it was global trade. This year it was “China Shock 2.0”. 

The #2 of the People’s Republic of China directly addressed the term which, to my knowledge, we owe to Brad Setser, American economist, ex-Obama and Biden-administration official and macro commentator supreme.
The shift in China’s trade balance with Europe is truly dramatic. Cedric Gemehl’s data from Gavekal are useful here. The deficit has more or less doubled in the years since Covid.

Comparing “China shock 1.0” and “2.0” there are key differences. 

China’s exports overwhelmed western manufacturers in low-tech, low-wage sectors
The first “China shock” back in the early 2000s was a straight-forward cost-of-production, market-access story. China’s exports overwhelmed western manufacturers in low-tech, low-wage sectors. 

China Shock 2.0, by contrast, is above all about Europe and it is above all about China’s progress up the industrial value chain. The shock is focused on a cluster of industrial sectors and, above all, as Setser and Tordoir highlight, on Germany and on cars. 

60 percent of the $27 bn euro swing in Germany’s trade balance with China between 2021 and 2025 is accounted for by vehicles.
Adam Tooze 28 June 2026




The first China shock in the 1990s and early 2000s flooded the world with cheap goods and redrew the contours of the global economy.

It let multinationals exploit labour arbitrage, playing off Chinese wages against the wages of blue-collar workers in America and Europe. It lifted both the profit share of GDP and the Gini coefficient of inequality to the highest levels since the Second World War

It rewarded capital while the West’s bottom half was left behind, poisoning our democracies.

The emerging China shock 2.0 is even larger. The Chinese economy is today twice as big as a beast on the global stage as it was in 2007 before the global financial crisis.

It is the mechanical result of structural policies pursued by the Communist Party with the stubbornness of the Ming dynasty at its worst. 

This has pushed China’s trade surplus to a record $100bn a month, surpassing the total share of global GDP reached at the peak of the China shock 1.0.

China is the victim of its own strategy. It is already in a classic liquidity trap. Credit demand is falling because people are battening down the hatches and paying off debt. The central bank (PBOC) can no longer gain traction by relaxing credit curbs.

The deeper the country sinks into its post-Minsky funk of debt-deflation and consumer retrenchment, the greater the trade shock for the rest of the world. Chinese companies are having to flog their wares on the global market at cut-throat prices to stay alive.

You could say that China’s rampant overinvestment is at least helping to solve one problem. China is rolling out renewable energy and EVs so fast that it gives the world a chance of stopping runaway climate change.

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard Telegraph 24 July 2024

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2024/07/24/chinas-third-plenum-is-almost-a-declaration-of-economic-war/



The U.S. trade deficit in goods narrowed to $96.8 billion in June

RE: Det är alltså typ 100 miljarder dollar i månaden.





Kommentarer

Populära inlägg i den här bloggen

Pfizer in 2019 sold $20 billion of drugs in the U.S. Its federal tax bill? Zero; Ireland

My blogg short index

Cognitive blind spots