What Germans Think They Know About Inflation Is Wrong - Brüning
Yes, inflation is dangerous, but deflation may be even more so, as the rise of Hitler showed.
By contrast, the monetary and economic event that contributed directly to the Nazi takeover was the crisis of the early 1930s, and in particular the deflation, or general fall in prices, that caused mass unemployment
That’s not how Germans “remember” history, however. Haffert, Redeker and Rommel did surveys in which they asked participants to estimate inflation in 1923 and 1932. Most thought that prices were also soaring in 1932. Almost nobody knew that prices fell that year.
The biggest surprise as that the more educated respondents were, the more likely they were to be wrong.
Adenauer and many others subscribed to conventional wisdom and wanted the bank to take its guidance from politics. But the bankers wanted to be totally autonomous. As Simon Mee, an economist at the ECB, has documented, they kept retelling the traumas of Weimar to suit their own purposes — conveniently glossing over the fact that the central bank was at that time also independent, during both the inflation and deflation.
In 1957 the bankers won, and the Bundesbank was born. It was completely independent and single-mindedly hawkish — and soon commanded awe across Europe and reverence at home. “Not all Germans believe in God,” a French statesman once quipped, “but they all believe in the Bundesbank.”
Andreas Kluth Bloomberg 18 september 2021
Den tyska hyperinflationen. "De eldade med pengar – sen kom Hitler." Fel, fel, fel.
Den uppmärksamme läsaren noterar hoppet på nio år från 1924 till 1933.
Vad hände då?
The Nazis only won 32 Reichstag seats in the election of May 1924, and just 12 in 1928. The Nazi party did not become a popular political force until long after the hyperinflation period ended.
The Economist, November 15th 2013
https://englundmacro.blogspot.com/2017/07/den-tyska-hyperinflationen-de-eldade.html
Euron är ett fullskaleexperiment för att se om Hoover och Brüning och Bildt hade rätt, om en interndevalvering är möjlig och om åtstramning leder till stimulans
The Germans should remember that Brüning was the finance minister who tried fiscal tightening in the 30s and paved the way for Hitler.
Brüning's austerity measures prevented any renewal of inflation, but they also paralyzed the German economy and resulted in skyrocketing unemployment and a drastic fall in German workers' standard of living.
He helped President Paul von Hindenburg win reelection in the spring of 1932, but on May 30 of that year Brüning resigned, a victim of intrigues by General Kurt von Schleicher and others around Hindenburg.
The immediate cause of his dismissal was his project to partition several bankrupt East Elbian estates. Hindenburg, himself an eastern landowner, considered this plan Bolshevism, and his withdrawal of confidence left Brüning with no choice but to resign.
Englund blogg 2015
Hur det kom sig att England övergav guldmyntfoten 1931
Att de hade kommit fram till att det var nog ingen bra idé att köra åtstramning under en depression för att uppnå en interndevalvering, som man nu försöker i t ex Grekland, Italien, Spanien och Irland.
Men så var det inte. Så smarta var de inte.
Englands beslut att lämna guldmyntfoten framkallades av att det rådde myteri inom Royal Navy, ett myteri framkallat av de lönesänkningar som regeringen beslutat om.
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